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5.  LAX  FINANCIAL REGULATION AS ENDOGENOUS VARIABLE: THE  MODEL 
 
Now we can try to design analytically the key elements of our approach. In defining the 
optimal characteristics of financial regulation aimed at promoting an influx of hidden funds  into a 
given country, we focus on the actions of a national policymaker in what we shall call a Lax 
Financial Regulation (LFR) country.  
 
Let us assume that this Policymaker  is aware that a potential demand for money 
laundering exists on the part of one or more criminal or terrorist  organisations for a total amount 
equal to W.  We analyse a situation in which the international market of money laundering is 
demand drive, as  it is likely to be in the real world; every potential LFR jurisdiction is a relatively 
"small country". Each LFR country  can define the optimal degree of financial laxity, and then 
determine the own optimal level of money laundering services supply. The design of financial 
regulation represent the contractual devise that determine the interrelationships between the country 
and the illegal organisations 43. 
 
The Policymaker  can decide to launder an amount of cash equal to Y, where of course 
0<Y<W. In our simple model the decision on the optimal level of money laundering services is 
equivalent to the choice of the optimal degree of financial laxity. 
 
Calling U the utility function of the Policymaker , it is obvious that the expected utility 
from unlaundered profits is zero, whatever their amount: 
 
0)( =- YWU         (1) 
 
On the other hand, every dollar (or euro?)44 laundered can have a positive expected 
value for the Policymaker , since the LFR country can derives benefits from offering financial 
services that facilitate money laundering. In the preceding paragraphs we showed how a country 
can derive economic advantages from favouring money laundering. For example, one might 
hypothesise that the lower the national income and the higher the proportion of that income that 
depends on the financial industry, the greater will be the propensity to offer money laundering 
services, all other things being equal. In general  let us define those expected national benefits as  
laxity benefits.  
 
Then the fact that the laundered cash, which we shall indicate with Y, has a positive 
expected profitability for the Policymaker  may be grasped by imagining that the monetary value B 
of this benefit is equal to: 
 
mYB =        (2) 
 
where m >0  is the  expected net rate of return on the money laundering services offered 
(i.e. on the degree of laxity) by the LFR country. The inflow of black and grey foreign capital 
                                                                 
43 In the model the policymaker choice of the optimal degree of financial laxity is assumed to be equivalent to the 
decision on the optimal supply level of money laundering financial services. An alternative view should be to consider 
the degree of  regulation laxity one of  the possible instrumental variables in order to define the optimal supply of 
money laundering services; it's a matter of fact however  that the link between the money laundering supply and other 
kind of  public policies seem to be logically and empirically more weak. Furthermore, should be easy to model the 
relationship between laxity and money laundering, considering both  random effects and lag effects. 
44 For the use of dollar or Euro in the black economy see  BOESCHOTEN and FASE  (1992), ROGOFF (1997), SINN and 
WESTERMANN (2001). 
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produces national revenues, increasing the activity of  the financial industry and then throughout the 
traditional  macroeconomic multiplier effects45. 
 
If, now, the decision to launder were cost-free, indicating with Y the amount of illegal 
funds for which the Policymaker  institutes the money-laundering service, it is a simple matter to 
see that we shall have Y = W.  But things are not that simple.  
 
In the first place, an LFR country may be subject to  international reputation expected 
costs. In the preceding paragraphs we stressed that to be more attractive to criminal or terrorist 
organisations, a country must make legislative and regulatory choices that increase its credibility as 
an LFR country. These choices may carry a reputation cost, however, since it cannot be excluded 
that being an LFR country can cause negative kickbacks, whether in relations with capital, 
intermediaries and companies sensitive to integrity or with international relations in general. In fact, 
we have tostress the possibility that under-regulation may be as unattractive for some legal investors 
as over-regulation46.  
 
Secondly, an LFR country must consider that laundering money means strengthening 
inside organised crime or terrorism, i.e. there may be  crime & terrorism expected national costs. 
The Policymaker  must first consider the possibility that domestic social damage may derive from 
the fact that the country is a possible growth engine for criminal organisations. It is obvious, on the 
other hand, that the less the LFR country registers the actual or potential presence of criminal or 
terrorist organisations internally, the lower the costs of crime will be perceived.  
 
In our  framework we do not separate the crime expected costs from the terrorist 
expected costs. From the theoretical  point of view, we prefer to stress the Policymaker different 
sensibility between international expected costs and national expected costs, based on a clear cut 
different political cost - benefits analysis, that characterised every LFR country. Furthermore, for 
each LFR country, it should be not difficult to introduce in the expression  (3) a specific parameter 
for each national expected cost factor. 
 
The cost C of offering money laundering for an LFR country will therefore consist of 
two parts.  
 
First, let us assume that the reputation cost is proportional—according to a parameter c 
>0—to the amount of cash it is asked to launder. Secondly, there will be a crime or terrorist cost 
whose expected value rises as the laundered money increases, for a multiple of the parameter c>0. 
Let us assume, that is, that for political-electoral reasons the Policymaker  of the LFR country, all 
other things being equal, is more sensitive to the crime and/ore terrorist cost, which can weigh 
directly on the country's citizens, than to the reputation cost, whose effect on the citizens-voters is 
probably less perceptible and direct.  We therefore have: 
 
 
 
YcYC 2g+=          (3) 
                                                                 
45 For a macroeconomic analysis of  the interrelationships between  money laundering, legal and illegal economic 
sectors see MASCIANDARO (2000). 
46 The inflow of legal capital can be assumed as negatively correlated with financial laxity, because of two main effects: 
a competition effect: in the legal financial sector, competition is distorted and the allocative efficiency of the market is 
undermined because of extreme financial laxity; a reputation effect: legal customers may fear to suffer a loss of 
reputation from locating their business in a country highly suspected for money laundering. 
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Lastly, we must consider, as pointed out earlier, that being an LFR country is an 
increasing source of economic, political and social risk for the international community. Therefore, 
when a country decides whether and to what extent to institute a regulatory design that will in 
essence offer money laundering services, it must consider that this activity is risky, since we assume 
that the international community might consider it a censurable policy, perhaps even prohibited, and 
as such subject to sanctions and punitive countermeasures.  
 
Let us assume, therefore, that offering money laundering services can bring with it an 
international sanction, whose equivalent monetary value is S, and a probability p that this conduct 
will be discovered by the international community and thus sanctioned. The probability p can be 
defined as the degree of technical enforcement of the international sanction. Let us call these risks 
the  international sanction expected costs. In this manner we are able to consider in our model the 
possibility that the international community define explicit sanction against the  LFR country. 
 
The monetary value of the damage from sanctions S against the money- laundering must 
be at least equal to the value Y of the laundered money. In reality, the damage from a sanction is 
certainly a multiple, because of the value of the intangible damages related to such a international 
sanction. So we can assume that the amount of the international sanction is a multiple of the 
“laundry” volume, equal, for simplicity of computation, to the square of that sum.  
 
And we should also consider that once the crime is discovered, the international 
community would apply the sanction with a varying degree of  severity, due to a political cost-
benefit analysis. The rapidity and procedure for applying the punishment may be variable, affected 
by national or international structural variables; this severity (or, if you want, the degree of political 
enforcement)47 with which the sanction is applied can be expressed by variations in the parameter t : 
 
2tYS =         (4) 
 
 
Thus the dilemma of choice facing the Policymaker  is the following: if I design lax 
regulations that favour the offering of money laundering, and the international community does not 
sanction it, the benefit for the LFR country is positive, net of the expected cost associated with 
reputation costs and crime and terrorism risks. If, on the other hand, the LFR country is hit by an 
explicit international sanction, it will not only sustain the expected costs but will also be damaged 
by the international sanction. The game is between the Policymaker  and the Nature,  given that we 
will assume the "small country" hyphotesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
47 Rider (2002) noted that the monetary policy  international policy is susceptible to political considerations. 
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Graphically: 
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Having defined the terms of the problem, the Policymaker  is thus faced with the 
problem of deciding whether and how much to launder, i.e. defining the optimal level of laxity. The 
optimal policy is not derived by any social utility function, but it is the result of  the Policymaker' 
maximising process, based on his own political cost-benefits analysis. The Policymaker 's expected 
utility E can now be better specified as: 
 
  ( )( ) ( )[ ]TCpCBpuUE +---= 1)(             (5) 
 
But since we have define B = m Y and C = c Y + 2g  Y  then 5) becomes: 
 
( ) ( ){ } ( )2221 tYYcYupYcYmYpuUE ++----= gg    (6) 
 
The linear specification of the function of Policymaker  utility tells us that it is a neutral 
risk subject. This utility function is consistent with the better economic characteristics in this 
situation. In fact: 
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In other words, we find that the utility for the Policymaker , and therefore for the FLR 
country, declines as the probability of an international sanction and its severity increase, while it 
increases as the expected return on the money laundering activity increases. 
 
The Policymaker  must now determine the optimal level Y* of money to launder, 
bearing in mind that the maximum resources available to him, given the potential demand expressed 
by the criminal or terrorist organisations, amounts to W. Deriving (6) twice for that variable subject 
to the Policymaker 's decision—to observe the conditions necessary and sufficient for a 
maximum—we  find that: 
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PROPOSITION ONE: it's possible to define the optimal level of laxity. The function 
reaches its maximum at the point 
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Y* represents the optimal level of money laundering supply services, that is equivalent 
to the optimal degree of financial laxity. Let us observe that for Y* > 0 it must be 
( ) 21 g--- cpm >0 , i.e. the factor of expected benefit from the money- laundering activity, 
considering the probability of an international sanction, is greater than the sum of the reputation and 
crime and terrorism cost factors. Let us define this condition as laxity condition. 
 
 
It is also possible to define the critical value Y', that  marks the limit beyond which it is 
definitely optimal for the Policymaker  to abstain from offering money- laundering services. Over a 
certain amount the damage associated with the risk of being punished by the international 
community is so high that the expected utility is negative, so being an FLR country would not be 
beneficial. All other conditions being equal, this result depends on the fact that the amount of the 
sanction is a multiple of the cash to be laundered, so as this value rises the damage from detection 
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of the crime rises more than proportionately. In general this result stresses the importance to have 
an effective design of the international mechanisms of sanctions.  
 
The critical value Y' must, of course, be compared with the level of potential demand for 
resources to launder W. If Y' < W, the amount of resources (W - Y') will be excluded a priori by any 
laundering decision. If, on the other hand, Y' > W, laundering is potentially advantageous for all the 
available illegal resources; we must then determine the actual optimal level Y*. 
 
Let us see to what value Y’ corresponds: 
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We can  evidence the relationships with the structural variables of the model for the 
optimal level of laxity. Firstly, the optimal offering of money- laundering will be inversely 
proportional to the probability of international sanctions: 
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Therefore, since we have assumed m >c+c2,we find that the first derivative is 
negative, so the function decreases as the probability of detection increases and the concavity faces 
upward. i.e. the second derivative is greater than zero. This means that  
 
PROPOSITION TWO : the optimal degree of laxity increases as the degree of technical 
enforcement  decreases. 
 
 
Y* (p) =0, i.e. it intersects the x-axis at point: 
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As expected, when there are no costs for the LFR country related to its laxity (i.e. c+c2 
= 0), that country will abstain from offering money- laundering services (Y*=0) only when the 
international sanction is absolutely certain (p=1). 
 
 
 
As p tends toward zero, the optimal level of laxity for the Policymaker  tends to 
+¥®*Y ,  but the Policymaker  has available a maximum demand of W, so it must stop with the 
curve on the probability level at the point where Y* = W . 
 
Let us then find the minimum possible value p can take ( mp ), i.e. at the point where Y* 
= W: 
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Secondly, the laxity of the LFR country is affected by the severity of the international 
community in applying the sanction: 
 
PROPOSITION THREE: the optimal degree of laxity increases as the level of  
political enforcement  decreases. 
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Therefore Y* decreases as t increases. When t tends to   ¥+  the first derivative is 
nullified. 
 
What we said about the case where p = p m  also applies here.  If, in fact, t  tends to zero, 
we see that Y* tends to ¥+ . But this is not possible, because the maximum level of illegal funds 
potentially launderable available to the Policymaker  is W. Therefore we must also find the 
minimum value of  t (t m) at which Y* = W; 
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The laxity of the LFR country will depend also on the profitability of offering money-
laundering services.  
 
PROPOSITION FOUR: the optimal degree of laxity increases as the level of  national 
benefits  increases. 
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The money- laundering will therefore be non-zero if the profitability lies in the range 
] ]max,mmm . 
 
Finally, we can then analyse the relationship between the reputation cost of money-
laundering operations and the amount of money to be laundered .  
 
PROPOSITION FIVE: the optimal degree of laxity increases as the level  of 
international reputation costs decreases. 
 
As we might expect, the relationship is inverse and equal to: 
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If the reputation cost is extremely high, then Y* = 0. Let us see for what value of c 
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Lastly, the money- laundering activity of the LFR country will also depend on the 
expected crime and terrorism costs, summarised by the parameter c:  
 
PROPOSITION SIX : the optimal degree of laxity increases as the level  of national 
crime and terrorism  costs decreases. 
 
 
 
( )
pt
cpm
Y
2
1
*
2g---
=        
( ) ( )[ ]cpm
pt
cpm
Y --=Þ=
---
= 10
2
1
* max
2
g
g
 
 
0
*
<
-
=
¶
¶
pt
Y g
g
 
 
 
0
1*2
<
-
=
¶
¶
pt
Y
g
                          if  
( )
pt
cpm
Y
2
1
*0
--
=Þ=g  
 
As the criminal and terrorism risks for its citizens increase, the propensity of the FLR 
country to offer money- laundering services decreases. As usual, we can also determine the 
maximum and minimum values of the parameterc, to which the minimum and maximum of the 
optimal laundering activity instituted by the Policymaker  correspond: 
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